In this article, we show that in models where location is endogenous, maximum welfare losses arising from non-optimal locations or from the lack of market coverage may be substantial. In contrast, maximum welfare losses arising from non-optimal quality choices are more modest, but they might vary discontinuously with the dispersion in consumer tastes. Very often, welfare losses can be inferred from data.
Introduction
An important issue in Industrial Organization is the study of the inefficiencies yielded by imperfect competition. In a pathbreaking contribution, Harberger (1954) provided a quantitative estimate of these inefficiencies by computing the "Harberger triangle" for a number of US manufacturing industries. Later studies disputed his findings pointing out other sources of welfare losses, such as lack of cost minimization (Leibenstein 1966) , expenses of acquiring/maintaining market power (Tullock 1967) , or sunk entry costs (Eaton and Lipsey 1978 , 1981 . 1 In this article, we aim to contribute to this literature by studying the welfare properties of three models of endogenous product choice: the Hotelling (linear) model (Hotelling 1929 , d'Aspremont, Gabszewicz, and Thisse 1979 , Economides 1984 , the Salop (circular) model (Salop 1979) , and the vertical (quality) differentiation model , 1980 , and Shaked and Sutton 1982 , 1983 ). We will see that in all these models, location and market coverage play a paramount role in the determination of welfare losses. And Lerner's degree of monopoly, and thus, Harberger triangle, does not play any role determining welfare losses. Let us see why.
First we consider the Hotelling model. Following Harberger (1954) , we define the percentage of welfare losses (PWL) as the percentage at which equilibrium welfare falls short of the optimum. We show that PWL depends on the reservation price and marginal costs in a non-monotonic way. The reason is that a change in these variables not only changes welfare for given locations but also causes firms to relocate. Next, we study if PWL can be inferred from observable variables such as prices, marginal costs, location, and the percentage of market coverage. We find that, in most cases, PWL can be calculated from location and market coverage alone. PWL decreases with market coverage (unless in the optimum the whole market should not be covered, in which case PWL is constant) and with the distance from the market edges to brand locations. PWL might be up to 37%, showing that distortions arising from nonoptimal locations and the lack of market coverage could be very significant. 2 We decompose PWL to separate the effects of non-optimal locations and non-optimal market coverage on welfare. In the case of covered market, welfare losses are entirely due to non-optimal locations of the firms. In the case of uncovered market, up to half of welfare losses are due to non-optimal locations. Next, we consider a model of a circular city (Salop 1979) . Here, PWL depends on the magnitudes mentioned in the Hotelling case and also on the number of firms. As in the Hotelling model, PWL decreases with the market coverage, unless in the optimum the whole market should not be covered, in which case PWL is constant in market coverage. Here, PWL can be calculated in all cases. Since in this model there are no misallocations due to non-optimal locations and the only source of distortion is non-optimal market coverage, PWL tends to be smaller than in the Hotelling model. But these losses might be up to 23%.
Finally, we study vertical (quality) differentiation Thisse 1979, 1980; Sutton 1982, 1983) . We find that PWL is a discontinuous function of the dispersion in consumer tastes with a maximum of about 8.33%. The discontinuity is caused by the fact that there is a point in which a lowquality firm freezes the quality of its good and does not serve consumers with very low taste for quality. This discontinuity arises at the point at which the market becomes uncovered. Welfare losses can be computed from market prices, marginal cost per unit of quality, market coverage and best available quality. When the market is uncovered, PWL depends only on the market coverage, in a decreasing way, as expected. As in the Hotelling model, we decompose PWL here to distinguish between two sources of distortion: non-optimal quality choice and non-optimal market coverage. Under full market coverage, welfare losses are solely due to non-optimal quality choice. In the case of uncovered market, welfare losses are generated both by non-optimal quality choice and by non-optimal market coverage.
This article is somewhat related to Corchón (2008) and Corchón and Zudenkova (2009) who also focused on calculating welfare losses and used similar techniques. The contribution of this article relative to those is in highlighting the effects of location, market coverage, and quality on welfare losses.
There is a burgeoning literature on the effect of quality on social welfare when the former is endogenous. Gandhi et al. (2008) found that the welfare effects of merger can be substantially different when one does and does not allow for endogenous re-positioning. Draganska, Mazzeo, and Sei (2009) simulated the effect of a merger between the two largest ice cream manufacturers in U.S. and found little impact on consumer welfare. Fan (2012) found that ignoring adjustments in quality causes substantial differences in the effects of mergers in the U.S. Daily Newspaper Market. Eizenberg (2011) showed that when computer makers are required to offer PC configurations using the oldest chips in the market, the consumer welfare benefits are small in the U.S. home PC market. Crawford, Shcherbakov, and Shum (2011) found that the welfare effects of market power over quality can be of comparable magnitude to the welfare effects of market power over price in U.S. cable television markets. This literature proposes more flexible functional forms for demand than those considered in this article but does not address the welfare impact of market coverage and how to recover welfare losses from data.
Summing up, our paper suggests that location and market coverage might play an important role in the size of welfare losses. A word of caution is advisable here. Our results have been obtained under strong assumptions about symmetry in demand and cost functions and the form of those functions. Thus, our results show what lessons can be learned in three simple models and might serve as a stepping stone to the study of welfare properties in more general models.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 studies the Hotelling model. Section 3 proceeds with the Salop model. Section 4 considers the vertical differentiation model. Finally, Section 5 sums up our findings and outlines some possible extensions of our work.
Horizontal differentiation: the Hotelling model
There are two firms producing a differentiated good. Consumers purchase either one unit or none of the differentiated good according to preferences, prices, and the distribution of the two brands in product space. Brands are located in the interval 0; 1 ½ . Each consumer has a most-preferred brand specification τ. Consumers are uniformly distributed along 0; 1 ½ with density 1. A brand located at point x i , i ¼ 1; 2, is valued for the consumer at point τ according to
where α stands for the reservation price, x i À τ j j is the Euclidean distance between x i and τ, β measures the importance of transportation costs, and α and β are positive. The decision rule of consumer τ is as follows: to purchase one unit of brand x i if max i U x i ; τ ð ÞÀ p i ½ ! 0, where p i is the price of brand x i , i ¼ 1; 2. The marginal cost of production is c < α. Summing up, a linear horizontal market is a list of positive real numbers α; β; c f gwith α > c. Let us consider a two-stage game. In the first stage, firms choose their locations x 1 and x 2 simultaneously. In the second stage, they choose prices simultaneously. Without loss of generality, we assume that
, where D i is the demand of firm i. It is easy to show that profit functions are continuous and concave and a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium exists. 3 We consider three equilibrium configurations: local monopolistic equilibrium, touching equilibrium, and oligopolistic equilibrium. 4 We characterize equilibria where consumers at the edges of the market buy the differentiated good. 5 In Lemma 1 in Appendix A, we show that the equilibrium configuration depends on the values taken by αÀc β . -For low values of αÀc β , local monopolies arise. The firms enjoy monopolistic power at the market edges, while consumers in the center of the market do not purchase the differentiated commodity. The higher the value of αÀc β , the closer firm 1 (resp. firm 2) is to location 1 4 (resp. 3 4 ).
-For intermediate values of αÀc β , markets touch, and a touching equilibrium arises. The whole market is covered, the firms do not compete for the market center consumers but do not extract full surplus from the market edges consumers. The higher the value of αÀc β , the closer the firms are to the edges 3 See Economides (1986) for the general case of U x i ; τ ð Þ¼α À β x i À τ j j with 2. Economides (1986) showed existence of a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium for 2 1:26; 2 ð . 4 Following Economides (1984) , we use term "touching" for an equilibrium in which the markets just touch and there is no tangency of demand. 5 Economides (1984) studied the case of a "not-too-high" reservation price where consumers at the edges of the market prefer not to purchase the differentiated good. of the market. Moreover, as αÀc β grows further, the firms reach the edges of the market and stay there.
-Finally, for high values of αÀc β , an oligopolistic equilibrium arises in which the entire market is covered, the firms are situated at the edges of the market and compete for the market center consumers.
Define social welfare W as the gross consumer surplus minus costs (i.e. the marginal cost and the consumers' transportation costs):
which in equilibrium is equal to
The first line corresponds to the local monopolistic equilibrium. The second line corresponds to the touching equilibrium in which the firms are located inside the market. Finally, the third line corresponds to the touching equilibrium with the firms located at the edges of the market and to the oligopolistic equilibrium. Note that social welfare does not depend directly on price. However, price affects market coverage and therefore indirectly affects social welfare. Social welfare is directly affected by the market coverage and firms' locations, which determine the consumers' transportation costs and the consumers' surplus net of marginal cost. This is the reason why social welfare in the touching equilibrium with the firms located at the edges of the market is the same as social welfare in the oligopolistic equilibrium (the third line of eq. [1]). Indeed, in both cases the whole market is covered and the firms are located at the market edges.
We next decompose social welfare in order to explore the magnitudes of these two effects (the market coverage and firms' locations). For intermediate and high values of αÀc β , the entire market is covered at equilibrium price. Pricing at marginal cost would also result in full market coverage and so would not affect social welfare. However, for low values of αÀc β , the market is not entirely covered. In this case, marginal-cost pricing would lead to a larger market coverage and therefore to a higher social welfare. Fixing the firms' locations at a local monopolistic equilibrium level but assuming marginal-cost pricing for low values of αÀc β yields the social welfare in case non-optimal locations of the firms were the only source of distortion. The formal result can be found in Appendix B. A social planner would choose the price equal to marginal cost and the firms' locations to maximize social welfare. One can check that the social welfare in the optimum, denoted by W o , is equal to
where the first line corresponds to the case where the market is uncovered and consumers at the market center do not purchase the differentiated commodity; the second line corresponds to the case where the entire market is covered and the firms are located at 
In Appendix B, we also find the PWL in case non-optimal locations of the firms were the only source of distortion , denoted by PWL L . only changes welfare for given locations but causes reallocation effects that may overcome the latter effect. For instance, a decrease in transportation costs β makes the economy more competitive, but at the same time causes firms to relocate away from each other, increasing monopoly power.
-For very low values of αÀc β , PWL is constant. In this case, the market is not covered either in equilibrium or in the optimum. Welfare losses are due to the firms' monopolistic behavior. Moreover, decomposition of welfare losses shows that exactly one half of PWL is due to non-optimal locations of the firms, while the other half is due to non-optimal pricing reflected in market coverage.
-For slightly higher αÀc β , PWL is decreasing in αÀc β . In this case, in equilibrium the market is not covered, while in the optimum it should be covered. Indeed, with an increase of αÀc β , the equilibrium configuration gets closer to the optimum configuration 1 4 and 3 4 . In this case, less than one half of PWL is due to non-optimal locations, while more than one half to non-optimal market coverage.
-Then, for one particular value of Welfare Effects of Location and Quality in Oligopoly -Finally, for high αÀc β , PWL is decreasing in αÀc β . Here, in equilibrium, the firms are located at the market edges and compete for the consumers located at the market center.
So far, we have analyzed the relationship between PWL and the parameters defining a linear horizontal market α; β; c f g. These parameters are the fundamentals in a linear horizontal market. But α and β represent the tastes of consumers and thus are not directly observable. The question is whether by using parameters that are directly observable, like prices, output, and market coverage, we can recover the values of the fundamentals and, consequently, of welfare losses. We assume that marginal cost is observable, because under constant returns, it equals average variable cost, which in principle can be observed (wages, raw materials, etc.). Formally, an Observation is a tuple p; c; x; m f gof market price p, marginal cost c p > c ð Þ, the relative distance from the market edges to brand locations x 2 0; 0:25 ½ , and the percentage of market coverage m 2 0; 1 ½ . We proceed in the following way. For each observation p; c; x; m f g , we construct a linear horizontal market αðp; c; x; m Þ; βðp; c; x; m Þ; c f g where in equilibrium the firms are located at x and 1 À x, charge price p, and cover share m of the market. For some observations, there is just one such market. Therefore, those are consistent with one equilibrium arising in this market. For example, if the market is not covered ðm < 1Þ, then such an observation is consistent only with a local monopolistic equilibrium. However, for other observations, two markets can be constructed. Then, those observations are consistent with two equilibria. For example, if the market is covered ðm ¼ 1Þ and the firms are located at the market edges ðx ¼ 0Þ, then such an observation is consistent with a touching equilibrium and also with an oligopolistic equilibrium. Indeed, with available observables, there is no way to distinguish between a touching equilibrium with the firms located at the market edges and an oligopolistic equilibrium. The details are given in Appendix C. Our next step is to relate PWL with observable variables. For each observation p; c; x; m f g , we do so by plugging αðp; c; x; m Þ; βðp; c; x; m Þ; c f g constructed as described before into the formula for PWL which corresponds to an equilibrium consistent with that observation. For example, consider an observation p; c; x; m f g such that m < 1. For this observation, there is a linear horizontal market αðp; c; x; m Þ; βðp; c; x; m Þ; c f g in which a local monopolistic equilibrium arises. Then, plugging αðp; c; x; m Þ; βðp; c; x; m Þ; c f g into the second line of eq.
[2] (which corresponds to a local monopolistic equilibrium) yields PWL as a function of this observation. The following proposition summarizes our findings. The proof of this and other propositions can be found in the Appendix.
Proposition 1 i) If the market is not covered ðm < 1Þ and the firms are located at or close to the market edges ð0 x < 0:11Þ, then PWL is about 37.4% independently of the firms' exact locations. ii) If the market is not covered ðm < 1Þ and the firms are located further away from the market edges ð0:11 x < 0:25Þ, then PWL is a decreasing function of the distance between the market edges and brand locations, x. iii) If the market is covered ðm ¼ 1Þ and the firms are located inside the market and not at the market edges ð0 <x 0:25Þ, then PWL is a decreasing function of the distance between the market edges and brand locations, x. iv) If the market is covered ðm ¼ 1Þ and the firms are located at the market edges ðx ¼ 0Þ, then PWL can take any value between 0 and 8:6%.
Figure 2 depicts PWL as a function of observables. In general, as expected, PWL decreases with market coverage (unless in the optimum the whole market should not be covered, in which case PWL is constant) and with the distance x from the market edges, as it goes to the optimal location 0.25. Other points are worth discussing. Firstly, PWL can be calculated from location and market coverage in three out of four cases in Proposition 1. Only in the case where the whole market is covered and the firms are located at the market edges ðm ¼ 1; x ¼ 0Þ, PWL could take any value between zero and 8.6%, even if price and marginal cost are observed. 6, 7 Secondly, maximum PWL is large. This shows that misallocation arising from non-optimal locations of the firms could be very significant, especially when the market is uncovered. See Figure 2 .
Horizontal differentiation: the Salop model
Consider the economy described in the previous section with the following changes. Firstly, the product space of the monopolistically competitive industry is a circle with a perimeter equal to 1. Secondly, there are n brands of the differentiated good available at prices p 1 ; . . . ; p n . Thirdly, firms do not choose their brand location, but are automatically located equidistant from one another on the circle.
8 Summing up, a Circular Market is a list α; β; c; n f gwith α > c and n 2 N.
where D i is the demand firm i faces and p i is the price chosen by firm i. As before, we consider three equilibrium configurations: local monopolistic equilibrium, touching equilibrium, and oligopolistic equilibrium. Lemma 2 in Appendix D characterizes equilibria for different parameter values. As in Section 2, the equilibrium configuration depends on the underlying parameters. When , markets touch, and a touching 6 PWL could be calculated, if the reservation price was observed. The latter is usually thought to be private information but, in some cases, it can be elicited by the mechanism of Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak (1964) . For the limitations of this mechanism, see Horowitz (2006) and the references there. 7 Knowledge of demand elasticity cannot be used to break the indeterminacy of PWL, since PWL is independent of demand elasticities (own and cross) and markups. This is explained by the fact that as demand is totally inelastic, a high price, unless it induces not buying the good, does not cause welfare losses. This makes a difference with models in which consumers may buy several goods where demand elasticities and markups can be used to find PWL, even though their impact is sometimes counterintuitive (see Corchón and Zudenkova 2009 
which in the equilibrium is
It is straightforward to show that social welfare in the optimum, denoted by W o , is
where the first (resp. second) line corresponds to the case where not the entire (resp. the entire) market is covered in the optimum. The PWL, defined as before, is
Notice that the first two lines in eq.
[3] refer to local monopolistic equilibrium. The first (resp. second) line refers to the case in which the market should not (resp. should) be covered in the optimum. The last line refers to touching and oligopolistic equilibria. Since in the Salop model firms are located optimally, positive welfare losses arise only when the market is not covered. We now study the relationship between the observable variables and PWL. As before, we assume that the market price, outputs, marginal costs, and number of active firms can be observed. Formally, let fp; x; c; n g be an Observation, where pð> cÞ stands for market price, x is quantity sold by each firm, which is defined as a proportion of consumers purchasing from each firm, c is marginal cost, and n 2 N is the number of active firms. Note that xn is the market coverage in this case. Then, we have the following result.
Proposition 2 i) If the market is partially covered with the market coverage below 57:7% ðxn < 0:577Þ, then PWL is about 23% independently of the exact share of covered market. ii) If the market is partially covered with the market coverage above 57:7% ð0:577 xn < 1Þ, then PWL is a decreasing function of the market coverage, xn . iii) If the market is entirely covered ðxn ¼ 1Þ, then PWL is zero.
As in the Hotelling model, PWL decreases with the market coverage, unless in the optimum the whole market should not be covered; in this case PWL is constant, ,23%. When the whole market is covered both in the equilibrium and in the optimum, there are no welfare losses. Also, PWL can be calculated in all cases. The indeterminacy that occurred in the Hotelling model does not arise here. Finally, since here there are no misallocations due to non-optimal locations, maximum PWL is smaller than that in the Hotelling model. 
Vertical differentiation
In this section, we study oligopolistic competition under quality differentiation. This model was developed by Thisse (1979, 1980) and Sutton (1982, 1983) . We consider a simplified version of Shaked and Sutton (1982) . Again, we have a two-stage game in which in the first stage firms compete in quality (one per firm) and in the second stage they compete in prices. Consumers' preferences are described by U ¼ ts À p, if the consumer purchases one unit of quality s at price p, and by 0 otherwise. The parameter t of taste for quality is uniformly distributed across the population of consumers, t , U a; b ½ with 0 < a < b. The density is 1 bÀa . Assume that there are two firms in the market. Firm i ¼ 1; 2 produces a good of quality s i , where s 2 > s 1 . Suppose further that s i must belong to 0; S ð . We relax Shaked and Sutton's (1982) assumption of zero costs and assume that a higher-quality product costs more to produce than a lower-quality one.
Formally, the marginal cost of production is cs i with 0 < c < b. Summing up, a linear vertical market is a list a; b; c; S f gwith b > max a; c f g > 0. Consumers with high taste for quality buy the high-quality good, and consumers with lower taste for quality buy the low-quality good (which must be priced lower to attract any consumer), while consumers with the lowest taste for quality might not purchase at all. A consumer with taste parameter t 1 is indifferent between purchasing from firm 1 and not purchasing the differentiated commodity if and only if
. A consumer with taste parameter t 2 is indifferent between the two brands if and only if
Therefore, the demand functions read
Three market configurations may arise in equilibrium: uncovered market (i.e. t 1 > a), covered market (i.e. t 1 < a), and corner solution (i.e. t 1 ¼ a) in which firm 1 quotes the price which is just sufficient to cover the market. Lemma 3 in Appendix F characterizes the equilibrium for the linear vertical market.
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For a > c, the equilibrium configuration depends on the value taken by Note that an equilibrium configuration with covered market or corner solution arises whenever p1 s 1 a. A low-quality firm will charge a price that exceeds a marginal cost of production, i.e. p 1 > cs 1 . It follows then that a configuration with covered market or corner solution might arise only when a > c. That is why for a c, only an equilibrium with uncovered market emerges. Figure 3 depicts firm 1's equilibrium quality relative to the best available quality, , firm 1 prefers to freeze the quality at constant level and not to serve consumers with low taste for quality such that the market becomes uncovered. Thus, the discontinuity arises at the point in which the market becomes uncovered.
Define social welfare, denoted by W, as the gross consumers' surplus minus costs: which in the equilibrium reads
Social welfare depends on the firms' quality choices and market coverage, where the latter is affected by prices. Thus, similar to the case of horizontal differentiation in Section 2, there are two sources of distortion here: nonoptimal prices reflected in the market coverage and non-optimal quality choices. We now decompose the social welfare to separate these two effects.
A social planner would choose the brands' quality to maximize the social welfare. Fixing the prices at equilibrium levels but assuming optimal quality choices yields larger social welfare in case non-optimal market coverage was the only source of distortion. The formal result can be found in Appendix G. Since a social planner would choose maximum quality for both brands, in the optimal allocation there are two undifferentiated firms that make no profit.
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The social welfare in the optimum, denoted by W o , is equal to
where the first line corresponds to the case in which the market is covered and consumers with the lowest taste for quality a purchase the good, while the second line corresponds to the case in which the market is uncovered and consumers with taste parameters lower than c do not purchase the good.
Consequently, the PWL reads 
½4
In Appendix G, we also find the PWL in case market coverage is the only source of distortion, denoted by PWL C . We show that in the case of covered market (i.e. for a > c and low and intermediate values of bÀa aÀc ), non-optimal pricing does not generate welfare losses. Intuitively, the market is fully covered at equilibrium prices as well as it is covered at optimal prices. It follows that prices do not affect market coverage. Neither do they affect welfare. Welfare losses are solely due to non-optimal quality choices in this case. This is in line with our findings for the case of horizontal differentiation in Section 2, where under full market coverage welfare losses are solely due to non-optimal locations of the firms. However, in the case of uncovered market (i.e. for a c or a > c and high values of bÀa aÀc ), there are two sources of distortion that generate welfare losses: non-optimal quality choice and non-optimal prices reflected in market coverage. Still, most of the welfare losses are due to non-optimal quality choice. See Figure 4 , which depicts PWL as a function of bÀa aÀc for a > c. It also depicts PWL C to visualize a share of welfare losses from non-optimal market coverage. Notice that maximum welfare loss is not large, about 8.3%, which is reached in the equilibrium configuration with uncovered market either for a c or for a > c and large taste dispersion, i.e. bÀa aÀc ! 1. PWL is discontinuous with the dispersion in consumer tastes bÀa aÀc , since firm 1's quality is discontinuous with bÀa aÀc in equilibrium. We are interested in PWL yielded by this market, conditional on the values taken by certain variables that can be observed. In order to simplify the exposition and without loss of generality, we present the case of zero marginal cost here. The general case with positive marginal cost is analyzed in Appendix H. Formally, an Observation is a list fp 1 ; p 2 ; m ; sg, where p 1 > 0 is a low-quality good price, p 2 > p 1 is a high-quality good price, m 2 ½0; 1 is the percentage of market coverage, and s > 0 is the best available quality. Denote by p 2 p 1 a relative price, that is, a high-quality good price relative to a low-quality good price. We follow the same procedure as in the Hotelling model in Section 2. For each observation fp 1 ; p 2 ; m ; sg, we construct a linear vertical market αðp 1 ; p 2 ; m ; sÞ; f bðp 1 ; p 2 ; m ; sÞ; sg where in equilibrium one of the firms charges price p 2 and chooses the best available quality s, another firm charges price p 1 , and the percentage of market coverage is m . We then plug αðp 1 ; p 2 ; m ; sÞ; f bðp 1 ; p 2 ; m ; sÞ; sg into the formula for PWL [4] which corresponds to an equilibrium consistent with that observation. The following proposition summarizes our findings. According to Proposition 3, in the covered market case, PWL is a single-peaked function of the relative price of the high-quality good. Thus, an increase in the 
Proposition 3 i) If the market is covered
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relative price can decrease or increase relative welfare losses. In the case of the partially covered market, PWL weakly decreases with the market coverage, as expected. Note, moreover, that maximum PWL is not very large. This implies that misallocation arising from non-optimal quality choices of the firms is more modest than that from non-optimal locations in the horizontal differentiation models.
Conclusions
In this article, we have studied welfare losses in models of horizontal (i.e. location) and vertical (i.e. quality) differentiation. A summary of our main results is as follows: 1. In location models, maximum welfare losses are sizeable. Except in a single case, welfare losses can be inferred from observables. Welfare losses are due to the lack of market coverage (both in the Hotelling and in the Salop models) and to the non-optimal locations of the firms (in the Hotelling model). 2. Under vertical differentiation welfare losses can be inferred from observables, but they are discontinuous with the dispersion in consumer tastes. The maximum welfare loss here is smaller than that in horizontal differentiation models. Intuitively, firms want to relax competition. In the Hotelling model, firms do so by locating away from each other, which results in non-optimal locations of both firms. In the model of vertical differentiation, firms relax competition by offering different qualities but one firm always chooses a socially optimal (i.e. maximal) quality. Therefore, welfare losses are smaller in the latter case.
The main consequence of our article is that regulators perhaps should pay more attention to variables like location or market coverage (see Armstrong and Sappington 2007 for an excellent survey of the theory of regulation).
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Several extensions of our work are worth mentioning. The models considered in this article are symmetric in demand and costs, assume two firms only (except in the case of the Salop model) and rely on specific forms of the commodity space. We hope that our methods might prove useful in the study of models with asymmetric firms, see, for example, Aghion and Schankerman (2004) , or models with other forms of the commodity space such as the Spokes model, Chen and Riordan (2007) , or the empirical models quoted in the Introduction and surveyed in Crawford (2012) . Another possible extension of our work would be to study consumer and producer surpluses separately and to analyze the effects of location and market coverage on each variable.
Appendix A Lemma 1
There is a unique local monopolistic equilibrium p
for a linear horizontal market α; β; c f gwith
There is a unique touching equilibrium p 
Proof:
Local monopolistic equilibrium. In this equilibrium, some consumers lying between two firms do not purchase the differentiated good, so the market is not fully covered. Each firm charges monopoly price p m . A consumer with preferred brand τ 2 x 1 ; 1 2 À Á is indifferent between purchasing from firm 1 and
In the second stage, firm 1's profit maximization with respect to p m yields
Plugging p m x 1 ð Þ into firm 1's profit yields Welfare Effects of Location and Quality in Oligopoly
After tedious calculations, one finds that @π 1 @x 1 > 0, so firms have incentives to relocate toward the market center still maintaining local monopoly power. Firms will move to the market center until consumers at the edges of the market are just indifferent between buying the differentiated good and not. One can check that in this case the firms' marginal relocation tendency becomes zero.
Consumers at the edges of the market are indifferent between buying the good and not buying it, which amounts to Touching equilibrium. In a touching equilibrium, markets just "touch". A consumer with preferred brand specification τ ¼ 1 2 is indifferent between purchasing from firm 1 or from firm 2 at price p t and not purchasing the differentiated good
At the same time, firms still enjoy local monopolistic power, therefore p t ðx 1 Þ ¼ p m ðx 1 Þ, which yields a unique touching equilibrium:
In the touching equilibrium, firms behave as local monopolists but maintain full market coverage so x . Thus, there is a unique touching equilibrium 13 It is important to stress that here, as well as in other equilibrium configurations in the models of horizontal and vertical differentiation, an equilibrium is unique up to a permutation of firms.
for a linear horizontal market α; β; c f gwith 
, which is an intermediate case between the touching equilibrium described above and the oligopolistic equilibrium, which is analyzed below.
Oligopolistic equilibrium. A consumer with preferred brand specification τ 2 x 1 ; x 2 ð Þis indifferent between purchasing brand x 1 and purchasing brand x 2 , if
so the demands D 1 ðp 1 ; p 2 Þ and D 2 ðp 1 ; p 2 Þ faced by firms 1 and 2, respectively, read
Firm i's profit maximization with respect to p i yields
and corresponding profits become
The "marginal relocation tendency of firms" reads @π1 @x1 < 0 and @π2 @x2 > 0. Thus, the firms have incentives to relocate marginally away from each other. The unique equilibrium has two firms locating at the two extremes of the product space (maximal differentiation) x 
The PWL in case non-optimal locations of the firms were the only source of distortion is given by 
Therefore, given an observation p; c; x; m g f such that m < 1 and 0 x < 
which is strictly decreasing for 0 < x 1 4 . Finally, let us consider the case where the entire market is covered, m ¼ 1, and the firms locate at the edges of the market, x ¼ 0. Here, with available observables, there is no way to distinguish between a touching equilibrium with the firms located at the market edges and an oligopolistic equilibrium.
In case of a touching equilibrium with the firms located at the market edges, let us fix 2 such that this observation is consistent with a touching equilibrium for this market. From the fourth line of eq.
[2], we get PWL in the touching equilibrium, denoted as PWL t , as a function of observables and α:
; where
which is increasing in α and achieves its maximal value of 
which is decreasing in α and achieves its maximal value of 
Local monopolistic equilibrium. In the local monopolistic equilibrium, some consumers lying between two neighboring firms do not purchase the differentiated commodity, so the market is not covered. Each firm charges monopoly price p m . A consumer with preferred brand specification located at the distance τ 2 0;
1 2n À Á from firm i's brand specification is indifferent between purchasing from firm i and not purchasing the differentiated commodity if α À βτ 2 À p m ¼ 0. Thus, firm i's demand is
Firm i's profit maximization yields p m ¼ cþ2α 3 . In local monopolistic equilibrium, the market is uncovered, which amounts to Touching equilibrium. In a touching equilibrium, markets just "touch". A consumer with preferred brand specification located at the distance τ ¼ 1 2n from a firm's brand specification is indifferent between purchasing from a firm or from its closest neighbor at price p t and not purchasing the differentiated commodity
À Á 2 . In touching equilibrium, the entire market is covered, D i ¼ Oligopolistic equilibrium. Firms are located equidistant from one another and compete in prices given these locations. Since they are located equidistant from one another, they will charge the same price p o in the equilibrium. Firm i has two potential competitors, namely firms i À 1 and i þ 1. Suppose that it chooses price p i ; p. A consumer with preferred brand specification located at the distance τ 2 0;
1 n À Á from firm i's brand specification, is indifferent between purchasing from firm i and from i's closest neighbor if 
which is decreasing in the market coverage for 1 ffiffi
There is a unique equilibrium with uncovered market
for a linear vertical market a; b; c; S f g when either 0 < a c or a > c and
There is a unique equilibrium with corner solution
for a linear vertical market a; b; c; S f gwhen a > c and 4 bÀa aÀc 7:6581. There is a unique equilibrium with covered market
for a linear vertical market a; b; c; S f gwhen a > c and 1 < bÀa aÀc < 4.
Uncovered market. When t 1 > a, some consumers with low taste for quality purchase neither good. Firms' profit maximization yields
Then, profits read
For 0 < a c, the condition t 1 > a is satisfied for all 0 < s 1 < s 2 . For a > c and bÀa aÀc > 3, the condition t 1 > a amounts to 0 < s 1 < s 2 bþ3cÀ4a bÀa .
Covered market. When t 1 < a, the market is covered and the consumer with the lowest taste parameter strictly prefers to purchase product 1. Firms' profit maximization yields
Welfare Effects of Location and Quality in Oligopoly
For a > c and bÀa aÀc < 1, the conditions t 1 < a and p 1 > 0 amount to s 2 2aÀbÀc 2aÀbþ2c < s 1 < s 2 . For a > c and bÀa aÀc ! 1, these conditions amount to s 2 bþcÀ2a aþbÀ2c < s 1 < s 2 .
Corner solution. When t 1 ¼ a, the market is covered with firm 1 quoting the price which is just sufficient to cover the market: p 1 ¼ as 1 . Firm 2's profit maximization yields
The profits are
This case arises whenever a > c, 
This uncovered market equilibrium outcome arises either when 0 < a c or when a > c and bÀa aÀc > 7.
Covered market. The "marginal relocation tendency" of firm 1 reads @π 1 @s 1 < 0. Therefore, maximal differentiation holds, subject to the restriction that the market is covered. It implies that s 1 ¼ S The PWL in case non-optimal market coverage was the only source of distortion is given by 
